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OCHICHI NCHIGBU AND SIT-TIGHTISM IN CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP IN 

AFRICA: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 

Jude Chibuzo Udenkwo 

Department of Philosophy 

Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka 

Chibuzotj@gmail.com 

ABSTRACT  

Leadership in post-colonial Africa has been saddled with lots of predicaments ranging from 

dictatorships, resentments, bad governance, banditry, kidnapping, extraordinary rendition, 

arrogance, bribery, apathetic corruption, abuse of office and fundamental human rights etc. 

African democracy in comparison with the West has experienced an unimaginable stay in 

power by her leaders. This is deeply worrisome. The frequency at which they hold grip to 

power has been a critical point of debate among scholars in Philosophy, comparative politics, 

diplomacy, and other fields of Humanities. Many scholars have wrestled, while many are still 

wrestling on ‘how and why’ many Africa dictators have continued to hold grip to power 

unceremoniously, against the wishes and aspirations of the people. There have been honest 

yearnings of people for leaders who can rise to the challenges of the time, leaders who can 

swim against the current, leaders of repute, leaders who can create the lasting change on Africa 

soil. To put this paper in proper perspective, this researcher examined the concept of Ochichi 

Nchigbu (dictatorship), and Sit-tightism as it affects contemporary leadership experience in 

Africa. Really, a sad fact for Africa and Africans! 

Keywords: Leadership, Ochichi Nchigbu, Sit-tightism, decolonization, dictatorship.  

INTRODUCTION 

Africa has about fifty four (54) independent states. Most of these states have similar political 

and socioeconomic conditions, owing to the striking similarity in geography, history, politics, 

and religion among them. A notable centripetal force among African states is the fact of having 

a similar experience of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and a relative evenness in 

the division into two sphere of religious influence—Christianity and Islam, the two being three 

world faiths of the Abrahamic category. 

The remarkable homogeneity in the socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of African 

states is responsible for the tendency to lump up the continent whenever there is an attempt to 

classify, characterize or assess these states, based on academic, research, economic and other 

strategic concerns.  

Why do African states display a marked similarity in their socioeconomic and political features, 

based on different indices or measures of characterization? This simply points to the fact that 

African states are beset with similar problems, as a result of which they respond uniformly to 

whatever variable that is administered across the region, and thus cause these countries to 

occupy similar positions in different ranking methodologies, like those of the world Bank, 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United nations Development Programme, United 

Nations Economic and Social Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations International 

Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and so on. 

Despite the relative homogeneity of African states, three major socioeconomic and politico-

cultural clusters could be seen in the continent. First, a perceptible line runs through the middle 



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part of Western and Central Africa, cutting the continent into two fairly equal zones of socio-

cultural influence. The northern zone is predominantly Islamic by faith and Arabic by culture. 

All the countries of North Africa, and one half of West African countries, including one half 

of central African states, fall within this zone. On the other hand, from the southern zone of 

West and central African states down to the southern tip of the continent, Christianity is 

predominantly practiced.  

Second, African states have a common history of imperialism and colonialism, most of which 

occurred in the not-so-distant past. Though some European states like Germany, Belgium, 

Portugal, Spain and Italy have either brief or insignificant colonial presence in Africa, it will 

not be wrong to assert that Africa was almost evenly partitioned between two European states-

-Britain and France.  

Third, most  African States are characterized by a low level of material advancement, low 

capital formation, lack of effective skills for industrialization, and other features that describe 

the condition of underdevelopment. With the possible exception of the southern end of the 

continent, driven by the Republic of South Africa, and the northern end of the continents which 

enjoy the benefits of proximity and economic association with the countries of the Middle East, 

most part of Africa is poor, and suffering from a host of socioeconomic and political ills. 

The above analysis is a perfect representation of the political economy of African states, which 

provides a fertile ground on which most of the political and socioeconomic trends germinate. 

One of these trends or political tendencies which are common to many African states, is the 

tendency among executives or heads of African states to cling to power for a long time, even 

throughout their lifetime. Since African states have been shown to possess common 

socioeconomic variables, it is the intention of this research to undertake a comprehensive 

analysis of the concept of political Ochichi Nchigbu (dictatorship) and sit-tightism by exploring 

a diverse range of issues and perspectives which feed into the phenomenon. 

 

OCHICHI NCHIGBU: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

In simplified terms, a dictator is someone who has an absolute control of power over a people, 

or a state. Oftentimes, this power is obtained through unconventional or forceful means. Over 

the years, the question as to ‘why and how’ African dictators continue to have a stronghold to 

political power against the will of the ruled has been recurring in a consistent consistency. The 

egregious and infamous 42-year presidency of Gaddafi (1969-2011) was a succinct example in 

the midst of many.  

Kawalay-Tendo (2020) submits:  

Modern dictators have survived by surrounding themselves with elite groups 

that are composed mainly of allies that were involved in the initial struggle for 

power. Insulating oneself with the cadre of ‘yes men’ is one part as the other is 

keeping up with their rents. These rents can present themselves mostly in the 

forms of ill-acquired wealth and influential government positions. Comrades of 

a dictator have a lot to lose if their valued leader is overthrown. Consequently, 

they will go out of their way to ensure that the statuesque remains. 

They do these effectively by circulating their voices, and championing the incumbent’s plan of 

action oftentimes through dissolution of political parties and removal of term limits. The 



       Jude Chibuzo Udenkwo                                             Ochichi Nchigbu And Sit-Tightism in…. 

 

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contemporary Africa witnessed years of political domination, and untold dictatorships during 

the 70s, 80s and even 90s. During these periods, Africa was a hotbed for civil wars, and acute 

political domination by a generation of strongmen, who held plum political positions at the 

center. The ruled endured poor health facilities, poor government dividends, apathetic 

corruption, bribery and deteriorating infrastructures. Any opposition or revolution from the 

people leads to brutal force using the state structures such as the police or army. There was an 

unimaginable Ochichi Nchigbu (dictatorship), emanating from the political class. 

 

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL SIT-TIGHTISM 

Starting from the days of monarchy to the present, the objectification of leadership or rulership   

with the ‘seat,’ the object for sitting down, has become a common practice. Seat has   thus 

become a perfect metonymy for political leadership, and its various forms like stool, throne, 

etc have come to symbolize political power. In the same way, to ascend the throne, or to seat 

on the throne, are common expressions for occupying political power. The person who seats 

on the throne is the one recognized as de jure ruler. In a colorful legend of the Ashanti people 

of Ghana, the founder of the kingdom was described as having received the mandate to rule by 

the reception of a mystical throne which, helped by the conjuring powers of a powerful mystic, 

was made to fall from heaven. 

This is the etymological and contextual meaning of sit-tightism. In common usage, it refers to 

the condition of extreme unwillingness to relinquish political power, even at the expiration of 

one’s political mandate. As posited by Anozie (2009), political sit-tightism is Nigeria’s 

contribution to the evolving vocabulary of dictatorship in the modern world.  

Sit-tightism is the adaptation of the African political class to the changing currents of leadership 

systems. It is an attempt to maintain a fortuitous middle ground between the traditional 

monarchical structure in which majority of African political systems was structured, and the 

modern demands of democracy and popular participation.  Being mostly democracies, (with 

the possible exception of Morocco and Swaziland which still practice monarchy), and having 

gained political independence from European colonial masters between the late fifties and early 

sixties, most countries of Africa witnessed two of the three waves of democratization 

(Huntington, 1991). The first wave occurred between 1826 and 1926, when most part of Africa 

was still under the effective grip of colonial masters. By the second wave (1945 to 1962) Africa 

had joined the league of democracies by virtue of the decolonization process. The continent 

equally moved with the global trend in the roll-back of democracy known as reverse 

democratization (1958 to 1973) during which many democracies reversed to dictatorships. 

According to Huntington’s serialization, the third wave of democratization started in 1974, 

(with the overthrow of the military regime in Portugal) and spread across Southern Europe, 

Latin America, and Asia. By the early 90’s, when Huntington’s book was going to the press, 

Africa had joined the fray, with one country after another shacking off decades of military 

dictatorship. 

Given the long period of experiencing various forms of military dictatorships during the reverse 

wave, and added to the novelty and consequent fragility of African democracies in comparison 

with Western states where the length of democracy was longer and more entrenched (having 

started to adopt democracy during the first wave), there arose a situation where leaders of 

African states were either unwilling to oversee the commencement of democratic transition in 

their respective states, or allowed the transition to different forms of pseudo-democracy in 



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which case group of leaders transformed from military dictators to civilian presidents, with the 

ultimate end of retaining power in the same person or group of persons. Focusing exclusively 

on West Africa, Dukor expresses this succinctly:  

One interesting observable political phenomenon, if not a reality, in West African sun-region, 

was the issue of military head of State who came to power through coup d’état, only to pull off 

the uniform to succeed himself in a seeming democratic election. Self-succession was certainly 

a new, if not a blizzard, horizon in black man's political lexicon and frontier...The development 

itself was an interesting addition to an encyclopedia of political thoughts, having derived its 

origin from military dictatorships (Dukor, 2003: 236).     

Thus began a process of populating Africa with sit-tight ‘presidents.’ Ekeocha notes: 

History is replete with individuals whose love for power turned into horrifying 

nightmares for their societies. On the parade in Africa are the late Hastings 

Kamuzu Banda, Idi Amin Dada, Hussein Havre, late Saide Bane, Mengistu 

Haile Mariam, the late Samuel Doe, Jean Bedel Bokasa, Marurs Nsuema, 

Mathew Kerekou, the late Mobutu Sese Sekou, Gnasingbe Eyadema, and so on. 

Some of them, in an attempt to perpetuate their hold on power, employed 

various means ranging from electoral manipulation, voodoo, kidnapping and 

assassination of their opponents (Ekeocha, 2003: 21). 

 

SIT-TIGHT SYNDROME IN AFRICA: AN EXPLANATION 

Human behavior has been, to a commendable extent, made explicable as a chain of causes and 

effects, actions and reactions, stimulus and response mechanisms, under the controlled rigor of 

social and behavioral sciences. Within this intellectual background, this research would explore 

sit-tight syndrome in Africa in three dimensions---the philosophical dimension, the political 

dimension, and the socioeconomic dimension. 

The Philosophical Dimension  

Right through the ages, philosophy has grappled with the fundamental question of how a 

society should be organized, and what should be the basis for any choice as to what best form 

of organization would prevail (Frost, 1989). Deriving from this broad compass are issues of 

who are most qualified to exercise rulership; what qualities or attitudes are most desirable in 

rulers; what are the best forms of relationship between the rulers and the ruled, or between the 

citizens and the state?  These questions have occupied the minds of political philosophical 

thoughts from Plato to Aristotle, Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, etc.  

A fundamental point of interest as well as point of departure in the ideas of these philosophers 

is the concept of power. Wolfe, cited in Lawhead (2003) defines power as the ability to compel 

compliance by threat or use of force. It is different from authority, which is the right to 

command and, correlatively, the right to be obeyed.  

Liberal philosophers and political scientists do not define power differently. Max Weber, the 

German sociologist, underscores power as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the 

behavior of others."  John Kenneth Galbraith in his anatomy of power elaborated Weber's thesis 

by adding that "the related purpose, the greater the power exercised by the controlling 

authority." Henry Kissinger, the former American Secretary of State, argues that "power is an 



       Jude Chibuzo Udenkwo                                             Ochichi Nchigbu And Sit-Tightism in…. 

 

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aphrodisiac, a sort of scintillating elixir, both to the person in power and his admirers." 

Kissinger’s contemporaries, known as the structural-realists, like Hans Morgenthau, Kennan 

and Niebhur argue that:"the quest for power is driven by human desire for domination" 

(Ekeocha, 2003). 

In spite of the differing interpretations, and sometimes mutually antagonistic positions taken 

by these scholars over the concept of power, they all understand that power is a very dicey and 

intractable force when being used, and often proves to be a true test of the maturity of rulers, 

as well as the maturity and freedom of followers. This insatiable lust for power is the reason 

why African politicians have adapted the instruments of government to their personal 

satisfaction and dynastic perpetuation. 

The idea of what amount of power should be lodged in any one man and, correspondingly, the 

rules governing a determination of tenure and method of transfer of political power, was first 

given expression by Plato. In his classical work, the Republic, and much later, the Laws, Plato 

theorized that the ideal society is organized in three gradations of unequal power and 

importance. At the lowest level of this organization is the stratum of workers. These are the 

uneducated, gullible, and unsophisticated majority whose labor is the source of the material 

satisfaction of the society. These are followed by the soldiers or auxiliaries who occupy the 

middle or second stratum. As indicated by their status, these are the guardians of the physical 

life of the society, upon whose bravery and self-sacrificing exertions the freedom of the society 

lay. At the top of this social hierarchy are the rulers, a class of philosopher-kings whose wisdom 

and sagacity is the bedrock of the survival and continuity of the state (Froost, 1989; Lawhead, 

2003). Plato went on to propose a system of education which ensured the maintenance of 

society through the preservation of this natural scheme of things (Anozie and Ekeada, 2019). 

It was not surprising, therefore, that Plato preferred monarchy over democracy, though he later 

argued in the Laws, that all citizens should have a voice in government, though provisioning 

the slaves for all works in the state (Frost, 1989: 182). This Theory of the state is fundamentally 

aristocratic, mirroring Plato's privileged background as the scion of an aristocratic stock. Even 

given the socialistic social structure which his theory of the state implied, in which all wealth 

should be devoted to use by and for all under the string guiding hand of the state, there are 

echoes of political absolutism which negate fundamental democratic ethos (Frost, 1989: 183), 

but rather support the concentration of political power in the hand of a few. 

Somewhat disagreeing with Plato, Aristotle was less inclined towards democracy and 

constitutional arrangement of power. “Aristotle held that a monarchy, an aristocracy and a 

"polity" in which the members care equal, are the best forms of the state. On the other hand, he 

condemned as bad a tyranny, an oligarchy and a democracy. Aristotle believed that slavery was 

a just practice in a good state, since it was for him, a natural institution. However, he would 

admit only foreigners to the state class’’ (Frost, 1989: 184). 

The Economic Dimension  

A materialist interpretations of society and all of history, is no longer the exclusive preserve of 

Marxism.  Contemporary social science and philosophy, in keeping with a prevailing 

multidisciplinary approach to social studies, have started to point to the fact that Africa's 

socioeconomic and political problems have economic dimensions as well. In other words, 

Africa suffers from a vicious cycle of poverty, inequality and unemployment, which have 

conspired to retard the growth of the region, and make it vulnerable to bad governance and 

outright dictatorship (Ochichi Nchigbu). 



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One could then understand why majority of the conflicts in Africa were either ignited or fuelled 

by the struggle of rival individuals or groups for resource control, for a fairer distribution of 

income, or for alleviation of the worst forms of poverty in the continent. In almost all the 

conflicts that have erupted in Africa, one could see the infamous hand of the struggle for control 

of oil, gold, diamond, copper, water, and uranium, and so on, or the struggle for control of 

political power, which would guarantee these results.  

To groom Africa’s economy towards poverty reduction, income inequality and increased 

employment, there is need to change the pattern of development from emphasis on national 

planning and building of gigantic infrastructure, to the provision of more enabling environment 

for free trade. Osadolor (2001) correctly argues that a major reason why colonial and post 

colonial Benin did not produce a class of wealth-owning and free-thinking indigenes able to 

fully grasp the opportunities for education, trade and politics as much as their Igbo neighbors 

to the East, was as a result of strict control of trade with outsiders and foreigners, by the Oba 

and his chiefs. Free and equal ownership and participation in the economy by all citizens, as 

the argument goes, reduces income inequality, provides employment opportunities, and 

ensures, if not effectively guarantees, democracy and good governance.  

In light of the above, the existence of great income inequality and unequal access to public 

resources by all has grave implications for the nurturance of democracy and good governance 

in Africa. This problem is more acute in resource rich countries of Africa, particularly those 

whose economies thrive predominantly on oil. The connection between oil wealth, the 

concentration of political power in few hands, and repressive governance, has been 

successfully made in Anozie (2009). Citing Okonkwo, he held:  

The most important feature of the oil sector, is its virtual independence from the 

rest of the economy. The output of the sector depends on very little contributions 

from the domestic means of production, and in particular,  it's share of the total 

labour force is very negligible. Hence the revenues are surely in the nature of 

surplus or collective economic rent.  By contrast, oil revenue makes a large 

share of the national revenue, and virtually the whole of foreign exchange 

receipt. 

On the basis of this remarkable thesis, Anozie (2009) went on to argue that oil wealth is great 

inducement to perpetuation of political power among leaders, noting that oil state leaders tend 

to have one of the longest tenure in office. This as will later be argued by Ekeocha (2003) bred 

political sight-tightism (which) ‘’is a Nigerian contribution to the evolving vocabulary of 

dictatorship in the modern world’’ (Anozie, 2009:200) . 

He further observed that Gabon's Omar Bingo (1968), Libya's Maomar Ghadaffi (1969 till 

date), Nigeria's military dictatorship (29 and half years), Egypt's Hosni Mubarak (1981 till 

date), the Republic of Conho's James  Sassou Ngueso (1987 till date), Equatorial Guinea's 

Ngyema (1979 till date), Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (1968-2003), and Indonesian’s Suharto (1965-

1998) are some of the leading names that testify to the reputation oil has as a political elixir. 

 

 

 

 



       Jude Chibuzo Udenkwo                                             Ochichi Nchigbu And Sit-Tightism in…. 

 

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The Political Dimension  

This segment of the on-going analysis explores the factors that either cause or contribute to the 

so-called sit-tight syndrome, which stem from the structure of and relations of power between 

the citizens and the rulers, and among citizens themselves.  

The emerging post-colonial African states have unwittingly reinforced the 

political values inherited from the colonial state apparatus. The gulf between 

the Nigeria ruling elite and minorities...is a result of power structures devoid of 

legitimacy or popular engagement. The genocide and ethnocide committed by 

Nigeria State support the suggestion that their forced annexation policies are 

designed to complete an unfinished colonial legacy (Mohammed-Salih, 2001: 

191).  

The first significant factor at work in conditioning leaders of African countries towards 

reluctance for predictable political transition is a conscious and unconscious carry-over of the 

mentality of colonialism. Political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have suggested 

that colonialism is monstrous development of capitalism and imperialism. To this end, it (that 

is capitalism) requires the mobilization of tools of exploitation and subjection, to realize. One 

notable instrument of colonialism, used by the British in most of their colonies, is the divide-

and-rule tactic. Divide and rule, as the name suggests, first sets the actors and entities that 

constitute an effective opposition to the rulers against each other, and then conquers and 

emasculates them one after the other.  Having made them powerless and inactive, an 

unquestioned and unquestionable period of reign is then guaranteed.  

Thus those actions and leadership tendencies that support sit-tightism are the descendants of 

the British policy of Indirect Rule. Colonial administration was undemocratic, repressive, 

exploitative and non-transparent.  The administrators were not accountable to the locals, nor 

was there a durable framework for transfer of power. In fact, the concept of peaceful and 

democratic transfer of power was alien to colonialism. That is why, having been thoroughly 

enmeshed in the infamous school of colonialism, the indigenous politicians who took over from 

the foreigners could not help imbibing the values and mentalities of their erstwhile masters. It 

is an indubitable fact that "the goal of the African elite struggle against colonialism was not to 

transform but to inherit the colonial state, (and this) is evident in its persistent authoritarianism 

and disrespect for human and civil rights in the colonial and post-colonial states alike" 

(Mohammed -Salih, 2001:24). 

Extending the logic to a General assessment of colonialism, Ezeanyika (2000) submits: 

Perhaps the failure of the British policy of Indirect Rule (more correctly, 

colonial rule) is best demonstrated by the continued failures of those trained 

under it. The very fact that the British trained the majority of those Africans to 

whom they handed over government at the end of colonial rule in Africa greatly 

mirrors their administrative capabilities. The continued exploitation of the 

masses by the elite classes, orchestrated through subtle autocratic 

policies...Ezeanyoka, 2000: 75). 

Another factor in the unique structure of the political system in Africa which has given occasion 

for the tendency towards power perpetuation through tenure elongation, is the uncommon way 

through which the political party system evolved and developed in most of Africa.  Essentially, 

while political parties in the West originated in parliamentary groups and electoral committees, 



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clubs and long-established ideological debating societies and religious movements, in Africa, 

only a few individuals or groups of educated elite established political parties (Mohammed-

Salih, 2003:5). This scholar further argues that "whereas the emergence of Western parties was 

contingent on the emergence of parliamentary institutions, the result of suffrage, ideological 

movements, union, church as well as civil society and social movements, African political 

parties were in some instances created instantaneously by a small group of political elite to 

contest elections in preparation for independence" (Mohammed-Saleh, 2003: 5). Moreover, 

because they failed to live up to the expectation of Western-style democracy, post-independent 

political parties gradually drifted towards traditional political structures, relying on chiefs to 

promote their election chances (Mohamned-Salih, 2003: 5-6). 

This development was made possible because of the settlement pattern of African societies. 

African societies were arranged in ethnic enclaves. For this reason, "the political constituencies 

were geographical in nature and ethnically homogeneous. Therefore, to win the support of an 

ethnic group was to win a political constituency. Since in Nigeria, the ethnic group homelands 

were quite large geographically and demographically, a strong political base was guaranteed 

(Nnoli, 1978: 151). 

African states thus became battlegrounds where ethnic groups of varying sizes and strengths 

contended for political power and economic dominance. Nnoli again states: 

Under the conditions of congruence between the interests of the political parties 

and ethnic associations, increased political active led to the politicization of 

ethnicity. The struggle for political power became interpreted in ethnic terms. It 

became a struggle for the hegemony of the various regional factions of the petit 

bourgeoisie, first in the regional enclave, and then in the country as a whole 

(Nnoli, 1978:152-153). 

It is therefore correct to conclude that "while decolonization has contributed to the emergence 

of a short-lived African nationalism, independence, on the contrary, contributed to the 

resurrection of ethnicity’’ (Mohammed -Salih, 2001: 25). Using their ethnic bases as bulwarks 

around political power, African politicians easily resort to sit-tightism, afraid that the 

precarious hold that their ethnic groups have on power, as well as the privileges and perquisites 

that come therewith, will be lost if politician's from rival ethnic groups, are ever allowed have 

access to the corridors of power. 

Another unpopular but widely used strategy used by African politicians for political 

perpetuation of one man or a few groups of men in power, is the one-party system. At a time 

in Africa, especially between the early 70's and early 90's only a few African states had not 

experimented with the one-party system at one time or the other. Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, 

Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, were common examples.  

The one-party system was a drug which exacerbated the very disease it was taken to heal. This 

is for the fact that though the "men behind the one-party regimes in Africa argued that the 

system was beneficial in order to control regional or ethnic divisions and curtail factionalism," 

arguing that the "one-party system reflected the basic consensus of African society" (Mbah, 

2007: 365), the system became, in effect another veritable tool in the hand of the rulers for 

pushing back the advance of democracy and entrenching dictatorship.  

Sit-tightism has found some kind of theoretical justification in the elitist theory of the state, 

variously expressed by Pareto, Mosca, and popularized in Mitchels’ the iron law of oligarchy. 



       Jude Chibuzo Udenkwo                                             Ochichi Nchigbu And Sit-Tightism in…. 

 

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One of the most widely influential proponents of the first concept was C. Wright Mills. 

According to his views expressed in The Power Elite and other works, society is organized 

around institutional power structures, the three most important of which are the economic, 

military and political communities. Each power structure is manned by a top hierarchy, or elite: 

corporate presidents and board chairmen, the chiefs of staff of the armed services, and the 

highest elected or appointed officials in the government, such as the prime minister or the 

president and his cabinet (Rodee, Christol, Anderson & Greene, 1983: 166-167). 

 

CONCLUSION 

As shown in the analysis above, both politicians in democracies and those in Ochichi Nchigbu 

(dictatorships) have one thing in common: the keenness to gravitate towards power, to 

manipulate it, and even grovel before it. It was in light of this universal appeal of power that 

Kissinger saw "power (as) an aphrodisiac, a sort of scintillating elixir, both to the person in 

power and his admirers." 

All societies therefore agree on the meaning and importance of power. Again, in all societies, 

it is understood that politics is the game for manipulating and utilizing power, for various ends. 

In this connection,  David Eaton sees politics as the authoritative allocation of values, while 

Harold Lasswell defines politics as the arena for determining who gets what, when and how 

(Appadorai, 1979). There is, however, a particular area of disagreement: while democracies 

produce leaders that understand power as a means to an end--the end being the uplift of the 

living condition of citizens alive and those unborn--dictators have a tendency for seeking power 

as an end in itself.  

Dictatorships, especially those that resort to political perpetuation, often argue that the 

challenges of nation-building, economic development and national security warrant the need 

to erode popular freedoms. They argue that what holds true for advanced democracies do not 

necessarily hold true for developing countries (Anyaoku, 2005), given the acute struggle of 

these countries to catch up with the rest of the world in development and wealth. On the other 

hand, advanced capitalist  democracies argue that freedom is a basic and universal human right, 

which does not require temporal and spatial convenience to be granted to people. They often 

cite the document on the American Declaration of Independence, in which the provision of 

freedom, equality and happiness, is deemed as the most fundamental duty of government 

(Jefferson, in Lawhead, 2003). 

This paper has shown the extent to which the factors that determine the freedom and democratic 

values of a society are dependent on a complex web of socioeconomic, cultural and political 

forces. That, in effect, implies that if one wants to change a way a people is governed, by 

possibly expanding their freedoms and ensuring popular participation in decision-making, one 

needs to first change the material basis of the society. 

There is need to find a middle ground between these extremes, to discover the golden mean 

between the unrestricted political involvement and socioeconomic freedom enjoyed in 

advanced democracies, and the total sacrifice of the freedom of the people at the altar of 

national stability and more often than not, one man's interest. 

 



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